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NOTES AND COMMENTS
actions prosecuted by public servants may vanish to appear no more. On
the other hand, if the proof of malice still remains within the realm of
reasonableness it is more likely that the decrease in the number of these
actions will not be appreciable.
The results reached in this decision seem to have been achieved by
weighing the possible impairment to Sullivan's reputation against the
pUblic need to discuss freely all issues of public concern. That libelous
ree speech would triumph will be shocking to some, but consolation lies
with Judge Learned Hand when, speaking of the first amendment, he said
that it "presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered
out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative
selection. To many this is, and will always be, folly; but we have staked
upon it our alL"
Rick Loewenherz
UNITED STATES: APPORTIONMENT OF REPRESENTATIVES
Traditionally the Supreme Court of the United States has operated
under a self-imposed restraint with regard to delving into political ques-
tions.' In 1962 the Court broke this tradition with its decision in Baker
v. Carr' and entered the first of the two major fields of political con-
troversy, that of state reapportionment. Now by their decision in Wesberry
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) they have entered the second of these major
fields of controversy, that of congressional redistricting. (For convenience,
realignment of state legislative districts will be termed reapportionment,
and the subject matter of this note, realignment of the federal congres-
sional districts, will be termed redistricting.) The plaintiffs in this case
were citizens of Fulton County Georgia, and were eligible voters in
Georgia's Fifth Congressional District. The population of this district
was about twice the average population of the districts in Georgia, and
was over three times that of the smallest, the Ninth. They brought this
action claiming the Georgia statute setting the congressional districts
deprived them of the full benefit of their right to vote as guaranteed by
the federal constitution. Four questions of law arise in considering this
new area of activity by the federal judiciary.
I
First is the issue of whether matters of congressional redistricting are
justiciable. Clearly this is a political question, and there is a political
answer- redistricting by either the state legislatures or the Federal
Congress.' Nevertheless the restraint on entering the political arena was
imposed by the Court and it may be lifted by the Court. Actually the
Court had lifted their self-imposed restraint on political questions before
2 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
1Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
2 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
3 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 4.
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Baker v,. Carr, but had reached a decision not to act on other grounds,'
such as declaring the "want of equity."' The significant point here then
is not whether the Court can decide political questions (dearly it can),
but whether its original policy of judicial restraint was not more sound.
II
Second is the question of "want of equity." While the issue of
whether the matter is justiciable is common to both state reapportionment
and congressional redistricting, there is another issue peculiar to the
redistricting which makes the Court's position less tenable in Wesberry
than it was in Baker. That issue is "want of equity." The United States
Constitution says:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legis-
lature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or
alter such Regulations, except as to the places of Chusing Senators....
Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its own Members....'
Thus the Constitution dearly directs that representatives be selected in
any manner prescribed by the states subject only to congressional
regulation.
Originally the representatives ran at large where of course each
person's vote within a state had equal weight. Then Congress made the
policy decision that it would be better if they were elected from districts,
a decision that it almost universally conceded to be a good one. Thus
Congress had exercised the authority vested in it by the Constitution
to limit the otherwise unlimited discretion of the states in the method
of selecting representatives to the Federal Congress. The first acts pro-
vided that the districts be contiguous, compact and, as nearly as practi-
cable, equal in population. An excellent example of that is the act of
1911.! But in 1929 Congress passed a redistricting act superseding the
1911 act, which deliberately left out the contiguous, compact and equal
population provisions.8
The constitutionality of state redistricting laws which resulted in
unequal districts quickly came before the Court in Wood v. Broom. In
this case it was held that the Constitution had committed the matter
of congressional redistricting exclusively to the political process. This
was reaffirmed in Colegrove v. Green.' In both cases the petitioners had
raised the issue of denial of equal protection as guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment. It is interesting to note in Colegrove that it was
conceded in both the majority opinion and in Black's dissent that the
Court could not affirmatively set new districts, but at most could only
declare existing unconstitutional laws void.
The majority in Wesberry departed from the Wood and Colegrove
4 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, (1932).
5 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, (1946).6 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 4, 5.7Act of Aug. 8, 1911, ch. 5, § 3, 37 Stat. 14.
8Act of June 18, 1929, ch. 28, 46 Stat. 21.9287 U.S. 1 (1932).10328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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line of reasoning. They held instead that 1) the concept of Baker was
applicable to congressional redistricting and 2) the constitutional pro-
vision that "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year by the People of the several states. . . ."" was
evidence that Congressmen should be allocated proportionally among
the people within the state.
Disregarding for a moment the unbroken chain of precedent and
all of the Constitution except the brief passage quoted by the majority,
this second contention appears reasonable. And so it is to prove what
the majority sought to prove, namely that the plaintiff had suffered a
philosophical damage. The majority made little effort to reconcile their
second contention with the precedent of Wood and Colegrove that
congressional redistricting is a matter for the political process, not the
judiciary; this was because by their own admission they were considering
only the "merits." '"This brings us to the merits,"12 the majority said in
leading into the discussion of their second contention. That is, on the
premise that the state's act constituted a legal wrong, the Court was
determining if the plaintiff had suffered any real loss. This begs the
critical question of "want of equity." Just as injuria absque damno will
not support a cause of action, neither will damnum absque injuria. Thus
the majority determined in their second contention only that there was
actual loss; this will be discussed in greater detail later under the merits
of the case.
The critical issue of legal wrong was disposed of with the first
contention. The holding of Broom and Colegrove was that at most there
was damnum absque injuria, that is there was a real loss but the thing
causing it-unequal state districting laws-was not a legal wrong (in
that there was no remedy at law) or as the courts termed it, there was
a "want of equity." The holding of Wesberry is that the action of a
state to so district as to dilute one person's vote relative to another's is
an actionable wrong. How did the Court arrive at this conclusion in
light of the plain statement of the Constitution to the contrary? In the
words of the majority: ". . . (T)he court in Baker held . . . the plaintiffs
had stated a. . . cause of action on which relief could be granted. The
reasons which led to these conclusions in Baker are equally persuasive
here."13 Thus stripped of the pages of excess verbiage on the merits of
the case, a matter not even a significant issue since the lower court had
accepted the plaintiff's position on the matter of the merits, this case
turns on the majority's summary statement that the conclusions in Baker
are persuasive. And what were those conclusions? Justice Brennan in the
majority opinion of Baker said: "The right asserted is within judicial
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment."'" It should be noted that
Justice Black in his dissent in Colegrove said: '"The equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids such discrimination.""5
Now the conclusions in Baker may well have been sound. With the
11U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2.
12 376 U.S. at 7.
'lid. at 5, 6.
7 369 U.S. at 237.
Is 328 U.S. at 569.
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Constitution unclear as to the role of the federal judiciary in the matter
of state reapportionment, it was presumably within the discretion of the
Court to interpret the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment as precluding state reapportionment laws which were invidiously
discriminatory. But no such situation existed in Wesberry. Here, in the
words of dissenting Justice Harlan, ". . . the Constitution, as plainly as
can be, has committed (this field) exclusively to the political process."' 6
There are only two ways the majority decision can be interpreted.
One is to assume that they held that the fourteenth amendment repealed
by the implication all previous parts of the Constitution which are
inconsistent with the "one man-one vote" concept which it has recently
been construed to embody. The other is to assume that the majority
simply disregarded the Constitution. The dissent of Justice Harlan took
the later position. He then voiced opposition to this situation, saying:
"This Court, no less than the other branches of government is bound
by the Constitution."" It is not apparent why the majority only incor-
porated by reference the critical reasoning behind their historic decision
and then went on to distract attention from what they had done by a
long philosophical discussion of the merits of a substantially uncontested
issue.
II
Third is the question of the merits. Here the majority presented an
excellent case for the proposition that it is wise to follow the policy of
weighting each person's vote the same.
Clearly the plaintiffs had suffered a political injury through unequal
representation. In Georgia the fifth district contains about three times as
many people as the ninth district. Other states have similar conditions.
In Oklahoma the most populous district contains about twice as many
people as the least populous. Only five states where the election is by
districts, Iowa, Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota and Rhode
Island have districts that vary less than 100,000 in population. Thus
only 37 of the 435 members of the House of Representatives are elected
from numerically equal districts or at large. It may be that this apparently
inequitable situation led the majority to reach the decision it did. The
argument that the Constitution leaves this to the political sphere must
have some weakness, else such a condition could not have resulted. And
indeed it may. Many of the state legislators are elected from malapportioned
districts." Thus the malapportioned state legislators and the maldistricted
Congressmen frequently represent about the same political philosophy.
They can help each other and possibly they do. The state legislators
frequently do not redistrict and in return the Congressman may tend
to favor legislation acceptable to these state legislators, such as aid in
preventing reapportionment. However the weakness is not insurmountable.
Since many states, such as Oklahoma, have a referendum provision the
people are always capable of adjusting inequities that become truly
onerous through the existing political processes. Also in light of the
16376 U.S. at 48.
17 Ibid.
18 Jones v. Freeman, 193 Okla. 554, 146 P.2d 564 (1943).
[Vol 2, No. 1
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Baker decision that state legislatures must reapportion, the cycle of
malapportioned legislators aiding maldistricted Congressmen aiding mal-
apportioned legislators is broken, if indeed it ever existed.
IV
The fourth matter to be considered is the mechanics of this court
ordained redistricting. Justice Black in his majority opinion in Wesberry
conceded that it could not be done with mathematical precision. Futher-
more both the dissenting and majority opinion in Colegrove conceded
that the court could not set the new districts. (Although this was done
by the federal court in Moss v. Burkhart as to reapportionment of the
Oklahoma State Legislature.)
So far as the Oklahoma congressional districts are concerned, they
could be formed without even dividing a county (not that there is any-
thing wrong with doing that) so as to be substantially equal in popu-
lation. The following plan might be acceptable to the Oklahoma Legis-
lature since it achieves substantial equality with the least possible
change in the existing districts and yet, as nearly as possible, groups
areas of like interest together.
District Counties Ratio"
1 Lincoln, Payne, Logan, Noble, Kay, Grant, Garfield, 0.96
Kingfisher, Canadian, Alfalfa, Major, Woods,
Woodward, Harper, Beaver, Texas, Cimarron, Pawnee,
Custer, Blane, Dewey, Roger Mills, Ellis.
2 Osage, Washington, Nowata, Craig, Ottawa, 0.98
Rogers, Mayes, Delaware, Wagoner, Cherokee,
Adair, Okmulgee, Muskogee, Sequoyah, McIntosh,
Haskell, Okfuskee.
3 Atoka, Bryan, Carter, Choctaw, Coal, Garvin, 0.96
Hughes, Johnston, Latimer, LeFlore, Love, McCurtain,
Marshall, Murray, Pittsburg, Pototoc, Potawatomie,
Pushmataha, Seminole.
4 Tulsa, Creek 1.00
5 Oklahoma 1.13
6 Beckham, Caddo, Cleveland, Commanche, Cotton, 0.96
Grady, Greer, Harmon, Jackson, Jefferson, Kiowa,
Stephens, Tillman, Wachita, McClain.
Or by giving Canadian County to District 6, Jefferson to District 3,
Pawnee to District 2, and splitting out 50,000 from Oklahoma County
to District 1, all districts would be within 1 per cent of the average.
These proposed districts are equal in population and are con-
tiguous but are not necessarily the most compact possible. It has been
proposed that to get just what Justice Black said was impossible,
mathematical precision, the most compact districts possible be determined
by calculating the "population moment of inertia."2 That is, the popula-
19220 F.Supp. 149 (W.D. Okla. 1963).
20 Ratio of district population to average population based on 1960 census.2 1 Weaver and Hess, A Procedure for Nonpartisan Districting: Development of
Computer Techniques, 73 YALE L.J. 288 (1963).
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tion of a given unit is multiplied by the square of the distance from an
arbitrary population center to get this unit's "population moment of
inertia." These are all added up and the district whose "population moment
of inertia" is the least is, of course, the most compact. Compactness and
population equality can both be taken into consideration in these com-
putations. Obviously this would require many calculations since it is
essentially a trial and error method, so a computer would have to be
used. This computer method appears to have considerable merit.
So much for the four questions of law. At this point it seem
appropriate to speculate on the effects of this decision on our system
of government, especially since part of the criticism of the majority's
position is based on policy considerations rather than on differences
in interpretation of the Constitution.
It would appear that the Court's holding was, in the words of
dissenting Justice Harlan, "a disservice both to itself and to the broader
values of our system of government." The unique political and economic
success of the United States under the concept of a separate legislative,
executive and judiciary at the federal level, testifies to the wisdom of this
approach to government. Yet the success of this system has depended
on responsible restraint in all the coordinate branches. One usually
thinks of the Supreme Court when thinking of self-imposed restraint.-
However the executive, too, wields less power than is available to it,
for instance in its general practice of concluding international agreements
by treaty which requires Senate approval when this could be done
unilaterally under the inherent powers of sovereignty which are vested
in the executive.24 But most of all, Congress has failed to exercise all of
the power available to it. For instance the Civil Rights Act of 1964
states: "Nothing contained in any titie of this Act shall be construed as
indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which
any such title operates to the exclusion of state laws . .."
With state legislatures now being reapportioned, and hence able
to deal with the problem of redistricting, there should have been greater
justification for maintaining the policy of judicial restraint in Wesberry
than there was when this matter was before the Court in Wood and
Colegrove. Furthermore, inherent in any judicial activity in the area of
congressional redistricting is the formation of policy. It may be wise and
good that districts be equal in population, but this is a policy decision
which should be - and is - delegated exclusively to the legislative branch
of government. It is not a function of the judiciary to consider the
wisdom of the statutory or constitutional provisions it seeks to interpret.
Congress has the authority under the Constitution to take away all
Supreme Court jurisdiction in this area since it can make whatever
regulations and exceptions it sees fit in the area of appellate jurisdiction]6
22 376 U.S. at 48.
2 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, at 345-348, (1936).24 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, (1936).
2sPub. L. 88-352 § 1104.26 U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2. "... (T)he supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction... with such Exceptions and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make."
[ Vol. 2, No. 1TULSA LAW JOURNAL
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It can only be hoped that judicial encroachment into the policy-making
funtcions of the legislative branch will never be so extensive that Con-
gress is forced to exercise this power.
Archie Robbins
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